The macroeconomic imbalance procedure and Germany: when is a current account surplus an 'imbalance'?  CEPS Policy Brief No. 301, 13 November 2013 by Gros, Daniel. & Busse, Mathias
 
 
Daniel Gros is Director of CEPS.  Matthias Busse is Research Assistant at CEPS. This paper was originally 
prepared for presentation to members of DG ECFIN, European Commission, 25 October 2013. 
CEPS Policy Briefs present concise, policy-oriented analyses of topical issues in European affairs, with 
the aim of interjecting the views of CEPS researchers and associates into the policy-making process in a 
timely fashion. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the author in a 
personal capacity and not to any institution with which they are associated. 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (http://www.ceps.eu) y © CEPS 2013 
 
The Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure 
and Germany: 
When is a current account surplus an ‘imbalance’? 
Daniel Gros with Matthias Busse 
No. 301, 13 November 2013 
he Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure 
(MIP) was designed to prevent the 
emergence of imbalances like the large 
and persistent current account deficits that 
occurred in Spain and Ireland. But within this 
mechanism, a current account surplus is also 
viewed as a source of concern. Indeed, last year’s 
Alert Mechanism Report (AMR),1 issued by the 
European Commission signalled an excessive 
current account surplus for the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg, while Germany just barely scraped 
by with a 5.9% surplus, marginally evading the 
6% threshold (over a 3-year average). With the 
most recent report,2 however, Germany’s status 
has changed. Along with the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg, it too has now been singled out as 
a euro-area country with a surplus above the 
upper threshold.  
It is clear that one single figure above an 
arbitrary threshold cannot possibly tell the full 
                                                      
1 The AMR was introduced with the European 
Semester, both of which are now standard parts of the 
EU’s new Economic Governance. 
2 See the 2014 report of 13 November 2013 
(http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_g
overnance/macroeconomic_imbalance_procedure/in
dex_en.htm). 
story, which is acknowledged by the fact that the 
Commission’s report calls ‘only’ for an ‘in-depth 
analysis’. It might be useful at this time to look at 
some of the key elements such an analysis would 
have to consider. 
The analysis presented below argues that the 
threshold for surpluses is arbitrary and should 
therefore be looked at not in absolute terms, but 
in terms of deviations from the euro-area 
average. Measured in this way, the German 
surplus appears much less of an outlier. But at 
any rate, it is difficult to argue that the German 
surplus constitutes an imbalance that threatens 
the stability of the euro area.  
An entirely different question, not addressed 
here, would be whether the German surplus 
constitutes a problem at the global level.  This 
might well be the case, but the MIP was not 
created to solve global problems. 
1.  What is an ‘imbalance’? 
A first key point is the simple question of how to 
define an excessive current account imbalance. 
In the context of the Regulation specifying the 
MIP, the Commission defines the concept of an 
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imbalance (applied to the several indicators of 
the scoreboard) as follows:  
any trend giving rise to macroeconomic 
developments which are adversely 
affecting, or have the potential adversely 
to affect, the proper functioning of the 
economy of a Member State or of the 
economic and monetary union, or of the 
Union as a whole.3 
The Regulation refers to a trend and the MIP 
system and its scoreboard are engineered as a 
preventive tool. Thus, the indicator should be 
forward, not backwards, looking. For Germany, 
the forward-looking average (2012-14) still 
triggers the indicator, but on a forward-looking 
basis, none of the deficit countries has an 
imbalance any longer (see the table below), as 
these countries are moving towards a balance or 
even a surplus in their current account position. 
Even the largest crisis-struck countries – Italy 
and Spain –are moving from a deficit to a 
surplus position, while Portugal balances its 
current account. For the Netherlands, the 
forward-looking indicator suggests that the 
trend is towards ever-higher current account 
surpluses, still justifying an early warning.  
 
Table 1. Current account balance as % of GDP, 3-
year backward (2010-12) and forward (2012-
14) average 
 
Backward Forward 
Germany  6.6  6.9 
Ireland 2.3  4.4 
Greece  -9.9 -3.2 
Spain -3.2  0.9 
France -2.1  -1.8 
Italy -2.4  0.5 
Cyprus  -6.7 -3.1 
Netherlands  6.7  9.1 
Portugal  -6.5 0.0 
Source: Own calculations based on AMECO data. 
 
                                                      
3 See Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of 16 November 
2011 on the prevention and correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances. 
The German current account surplus is expected 
to stabilise at a level just above the MIP 
threshold for 2010-12. The stark past growth 
rates are no longer a ‘threat’ to the balance of the 
euro area, albeit being still slightly positive. The 
forecasts of current account balances have been 
known to be considerably revised, especially in 
the current fragile state of the global economy. A 
small forecasted growth rate could turn into a 
rebalancing throughout the next semester.  
Why then use the forecast if its results are 
ambiguous? The truth is that past current 
account data have also been continuously 
revised, as seen in the Fall Economic Forecast 
which corrected Germany’s surplus from 
formerly 6.1% (on a 3-year average, i.e. 2010-
2012) to 6.6%. This reaffirms the view that the 
trend is the crucial indicator.  
Furthermore, the IMF predicts even a slow 
reduction of the German surplus over the next 
five years.4 The longer-term forward-looking 
average one can construct until 2018 on the basis 
of IMF figures is 5.3 % of GDP.    
For Germany the other indicators for potential 
external imbalances point in a different direction 
than the current account: the market share 
indicator for Germany is worse than the 
threshold. This would indicate that the surplus is 
not a result of surging exports, but rather of 
weakness in domestic demand.  
2.  When is an imbalance harmful? 
Negative spill-over effects 
Intervention by the EU under the Excessive 
Imbalance Procedure (EIP) can be justified if 
there are external effects. This is recognised in 
the official regulation: 
When assessing macroeconomic 
imbalances, account should be taken of 
their severity and their potential negative 
economic and financial spill-over effects 
which aggravate the vulnerability of the 
Union economy and are a threat to the 
smooth functioning of the economic and 
monetary union.    
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It states furthermore: 
The surveillance under the MIP covers 
both current account surpluses and deficits 
which, from an economic point of view, 
pose different types of policy challenges. 
In particular, unlike current account 
deficits, large and sustained current 
account surpluses do not raise the same 
concerns about the sustainability of 
external debt and financing capacities, 
concerns that can affect the smooth 
functioning of the euro area (which is a 
key criterion for triggering the corrective 
arm of the MIP). 
Unfortunately, nowhere can one find a 
description of the (negative) spill-over effects 
resulting from a current account surplus. The 
two potential criteria for finding external effects 
are a) vulnerability of the Union economy and b) 
threat to the smooth functioning of the economic 
and monetary union. It is difficult to argue on 
either account, however, that a high surplus in 
one country per se constitutes a threat which 
must be dealt with.   
The term ‘smooth functioning’ of the euro area 
must thus be interpreted widely if one wants to 
declare a surplus an imbalance. In reality one 
could well argue that a demand deficiency in 
Germany has a negative impact on the rest of the 
euro area, much of which is in a deep recession. 
This argument of course is valid only in a certain 
environment (area-wide demand shortfall or 
liquidity trap). By contrast the negative spill-over 
from sudden stops to capital inflows arise in 
almost any economic environment one can 
imagine. This leads to two issues to be 
addressed. 
Firstly, if (demand) spill-over manifests itself in 
the current accounts of euro area partners, one 
should look at the correlation of current account 
balances within the euro area. There is a strong 
negative correlation concerning the current 
account balance between aggregated Germany 
and the Netherlands vis-à-vis the rest of the euro 
area until 2009 (close to -90%), thereafter turning 
strongly positive (2010-14). What can be derived 
from this observation? Possibly that, up until the 
crisis, the German surplus meant a deficit for the 
rest of euro area, but this linkage is no longer 
valid today, i.e. at least ex post. Needless to say, 
correlation does not mean causation. At any rate 
the large German surplus did not impede the 
adjustment in the deficit countries, although it 
might have made it more difficult. 
Secondly, the size of the direct and indirect 
demand spill-over effects on the deficit countries 
is likely to be small, as documented in the DG 
ECFIN study of surplus economies.5 Even a 
sizeable reduction in the German surplus would 
lead only to a small change in the external 
accounts of the peripheral euro-area countries. 
However, in considering the external effects of 
stronger (domestic) demand in Germany and the 
Netherlands, one should look at the potential 
increase in employment that could result in the 
rest of the euro area or at least in that part that 
suffers from high unemployment.  But this is not 
likely to change the size of the spill-over effect 
appreciably. 
Thus, if demand spill-over effects are the main 
reason to label the German external surplus an 
‘imbalance’, it does not really matter whether 
this surplus has arisen because of higher 
investment incomes or because of a higher trade 
surplus. From a pure demand-management 
viewpoint, the key consideration would be that 
part of any increase in domestic demand in 
Germany would spill over into increased 
external demand and that about 40% of any 
increase in German external demand would go 
towards goods produced in other euro-area 
countries. This has considerable impact on the 
arbitrary threshold chosen for surpluses. It is 
difficult to justify a threshold for surpluses if the 
spill-over effect in a demand-constrained 
environment is the key justification of 
intervention, since this spill-over effect is 
independent of the size of surplus (as a % of 
GDP or otherwise). 
The upper value of the threshold is set at 
+6%. The upper quartile of the distribution 
of the three-year backward average of 
current account balances corresponds to 
+2%. To this an additional 4% margin has 
been added in line with the "intelligent 
symmetry" (??) approach to current 
                                                      
5 European Commission (DG ECFIN) (2012), “Current 
account surpluses in the EU”, European Economy, 
September (http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ 
publications/european_economy/2012/current-
account-surpluses_en.htm). 4 | DANIEL GROS WITH MATTHIAS BUSSE 
 
account balances. This allows tackling both 
current account surpluses and deficits but 
recognises that the urgency for policy 
intervention is clearly greater in the case of 
current account deficits. It also reflects the 
fact that the risk of negative spill-over 
effects of current account deficits is more 
prevalent than for current account 
surpluses due to sustainability 
considerations.6 
No economic justification is given here for the 
number that was adopted. Whether or not a 
large surplus is in the interest of Germany is 
irrelevant for the issue at hand. The purpose of 
the EIP is not to force countries to do what is best 
for them, but to protect the rest of the euro area 
from the fall-out of national policy mistakes. 
3.  Imbalance within euro area? 
Absolute or relative indicators 
As the EIP is envisaged to lessen imbalances 
within the EA, it is questionable to use absolute 
indicators to set up thresholds. If all euro-area 
countries have exactly the same external 
imbalance, the potential for disruptions that 
threaten the ‘smooth’ functioning of the EMU 
should be much smaller. Moreover, in this case, 
the recommendation to act on the external 
imbalance of the Union should go to the EMU 
authorities.  If all countries have a large deficit, a 
sudden stop to capital inflows would affect all of 
them at the same time. But given that the euro 
exchange rate is flexible, the sudden stop would 
play out quite differently than a sudden stop 
inside the euro area. 
And if most euro-area countries run external 
surpluses, a particularly large surplus in any one 
country should not be regarded necessarily as an 
‘imbalance’. Table 2 shows that it makes a big 
difference whether one looks at the indicators per 
se, or relative to the euro area.   
 
 
 
                                                      
6 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications 
/occasional_paper/2012/pdf/ocp92_en.pdf 
Table 2. Current account balance as % of GDP, 
average 2012-14 
Absolute 
Difference with 
EA average* 
Germany   6.9 4.4 
Ireland   4.4  1.9 
Greece   -3.2  -5.7 
Spain   0.9  -1.6 
France   -1.8  -4.2 
Italy   0.5  -2.0 
Cyprus   -3.1  -5.6 
Netherlands   9.1  6.6 
Portugal   0.0  -2.5 
*Difference with extra EA17 Current Account Balance 
as % of EA17 GDP. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on AMECO 
data. 
For the key indicator of the MIP, namely the 
current account, the difference between 
Germany and the euro-area average remains 
comfortably below the threshold. One could thus 
argue that if one looks at the deviations from the 
euro-area average it would not be appropriate to 
consider Germany as having violated a threshold 
(but this would continue to be the case for the 
Netherlands). 
However, looking at the deviations from the 
euro-area average would also lead to a different 
view of the remaining deficit countries. Greece, 
Cyprus and in particular France would trigger a 
flashing red light. The French deficit remains 
modest, but it is now far away from the euro 
area average. 
The Netherlands would still exhibit a current 
account surplus above the threshold, although it 
would not be far from the upper bound. The 
same exercise can be performed for the other 
external indicators. Notably, the difference is 
even more striking for the export market share 
indicators. 
It is clear that from the point of view of the 
outside world, the absolute surpluses/deficits 
matter and it is thus understandable that from 
the point of the view of the IMF or the US 
authorities, the German surplus remains a key 
issue. However, the purpose of the EIP is not to THE MACROECONOMIC IMBALANCE PROCEDURE AND GERMANY | 5 
 
consider the global savings/investment balance, 
but to signal emerging intra-euro-area 
imbalances. From this point of view, it is more 
appropriate to look at the divergences between 
the national external deficits/ surpluses relative 
to the euro-area average.  
4.  Conclusions 
The German current account surplus will exceed 
the 6% threshold for some time. In this sense, the 
Commission is justified in launching an ‘in-
depth analysis’. In itself this step carries no 
concrete implications because the finding that 
Germany’s surplus constitutes an ‘imbalance’ 
can only come at the end of this in-depth 
analysis. The Netherlands had a higher current 
account than Germany for some time, forcing the 
Commission to carry out an in-depth analysis for 
that country as well. For the Netherlands, the 
Commission did not find that its current account 
surplus constitutes an ‘imbalance’ worthy of 
corrective policy prescription. Given that the 
German surplus is lower than that of the 
Netherlands (and that the other indicators are of 
a similar order of magnitude), it is unlikely that 
the Commission will find that Germany’s 
surplus constitutes an imbalance worthy of the 
sanction that is theoretically possible under the 
EIP. 
The threshold for current account surpluses (6% 
of GDP) is at any rate entirely arbitrary. 
Moreover, one should not look at the 
surplus/deficit of any country in isolation, but 
relative to the euro-area average. The difference 
between Germany’s and the euro-area’s average 
surplus was over 6 percentage points in 2010, but 
this is no longer the case.  
Even abstracting from these measurement issues, 
a finding that the German surplus needs to be 
sanctioned is rendered unlikely by the 
difficulties that arise if one wants to make the 
case that Germany has a ‘harmful’ external 
imbalance, whose resolution would make the 
euro area better off. But at the same time, it 
remains straightforward to make the case that, in 
a Keynesian perspective, stronger domestic 
demand in Germany (and the Netherlands) 
would marginally benefit the rest of the euro 
area mired in high unemployment.  
This leads to the eternal question of what could 
the German authorities be asked to do to 
strengthen domestic demand. The Commission 
will find it difficult to argue that a fiscal 
expansion would be appropriate as this would 
require Germany to violate EU rules (e.g. the 
Fiscal Compact) and its own constitution.  
Higher public investment in Germany seems 
appropriate given its presently low level, but it 
would have to be financed by taxes, thus strictly 
limiting the impact on demand. 
It has often been argued that service-sector 
reform could unlock more growth in Germany. 
This seems very likely. But would it contribute to 
lowering the German surplus? The answer is 
very uncertain since reform of the service sector 
would increase supply, but it is not a certainty 
that it would also increase demand and boost 
demand more than supply. Service-sector 
reforms that increase productivity improve, 
ceteris paribus, competitiveness. One would have 
to hope that wages would increase by at least the 
same amount and that consumption would 
increase more than proportionally (than the 
increase in productivity). But this is not a 
foregone conclusion.   
Service-sector reforms are recommended by the 
EU for deficit countries with the opposite 
intended effect: to improve the external balance. 
It is difficult to understand why the same 
reforms should reduce the deficit in one case and 
reduce the surplus in another. 
The only measure that would in all likelihood 
have an impact on the German surplus is the 
introduction of a (high) minimum wage. This 
seems the surest way to increase demand in the 
short run, but this solution is not advisable in the 
long run; and the Commission is unlikely to 
recommend it for Germany. 
All in all, the announcement of the Commission 
in the context of the excessive imbalances 
procedure appears to be much ado about 
nothing. All the Commission can and will do is 
to start an ‘in-depth analysis’. This might trigger 
strong political reactions and lead to an 
enormous debate in the media. But nothing of 
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